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This paper reviews the empirical literature on the economic costs of corruption. Corruption 
affects economic growth, the level of GDP per capita, investment activity, international trade 
and price stability negatively. Additionally, it biases the composition of government 
expenditures. The second part of the paper estimates the effect of corruption on economic 
growth and GDP per capita as well as on six possible transmission channels. The results of 
this analysis allows to calculate the total effect of corruption: An increase of corruption by 




The harmful effects of corruption on countries’ economic development are widely 
acknowledged in the economics literature. Using formal as well as empirical approaches 
several authors show that corruption detracts investors, reduces the productivity of public 
expenditures, distorts the allocation of resources and thus lowers economic growth. These 
findings are reflected in the strategies of multinational organizations like the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the OECD, among others. The most well-known examples 
are the 1997 World Bank Anti-corruption Strategy, the OECD Convention on Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business (1997) and the recent (2003) United 
Nations Anti-corruption Treaty.1  
While the consequences of corruption on certain aspects of the economy have 
frequently been investigated, attempts to quantify the overall costs of corruption on the 
economy have only recently been made (DREHER, KOTSOGIANNIS and MCCORRISTON 2004a, 
2004b, 2005). What are the quantitative costs of corruption? This is the question our paper 
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attempts to answer. We present cross-section regressions estimating the impact of corruption 
on the most important variables identified in the previous literature. Combining the direct and 
the most important indirect effects allows us to derive estimates of the overall costs of being 
more corrupt than the average sample country on economic growth.  
The article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the empirical literature on 
the consequences of corruption. In section 3 we present our econometric results. Finally, 
section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
Since corruption is an old phenomenon of human history almost all centuries 
experienced discussion of this topic. Regarding the 20th century two popular examples of this 
discussion are HUNTINGTON (1968) and MYRDAL (1971), contemporaneously representing, 
however, opposing points of view. According to the first, corruption is a phenomenon of 
modernization that is not likely to affect economic development, whereas the latter clearly 
expects corruption to impose strong obstacles to a country’s development. This discussion and 
the related literature are reviewed in BARDHAN (1997), JAIN (2001) and AIDT (2003). More 
formally, SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1993) show how corruption might affect economic welfare. 
They distinguish between corruption with theft and those without, the latter being 
characterised by an additional bribe besides the regular price for obtaining a certain service or 
good. The bureaucrat acts as monopolistic supplier, thus corruption reduces equilibrium 
demand and therefore public revenues decline and welfare losses arise. Alternatively, the 
bureaucrat does not charge the regular price but still demands a bribe. While the impact on 
supply is not straightforward to quantify, welfare losses arise at least in the form of reduced 
public revenues. They might be complemented by welfare losses due to lower supply, 
depending on the specific situation. Empirical studies estimating welfare effects usually focus 
on the impact of corruption on aggregated indicators instead of actual prices of single services 
or goods.2 Until recently, the availability of appropriate measures of corruption posed the 
main obstacle to empirical research. This changed substantially over the second half of the 
90s, however. Basically, three different groups of corruption indices emerged: First, indices 
like those of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business International (BI) 
base on the assessment of country experts. The second group is derived from surveys among 
foreign or native businesspeople or the broad public. Examples are the indicators reported in 
the 1997 World Development Report (WDR), by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and by 
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the Institute for Management Development (IMD). The third and last group consists of so 
called ‘polls of polls’ and includes the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency 
International and the Graft-index developed by the World Bank. Both indices are constructed 
using several corruption indicators with the aim of enlarging country coverage and reducing 
measurement error. 
Starting with the seminal work of MAURO (1995) – employing the BI index – a broad 
empirical research based on those indices emerged. As another example, KNACK and KEEFER 
(1995) introduced the ICRG index to the literature, JOHNSON ET AL. (1998) and LAMBSDORFF 
(1998) were among the first to use Transparency International’s index.  
The availability of proxies for the degree of corruption inspired new research and 
resulted in more than 50 papers on the economic consequences of corruption.3 Figure 1 shows 
the number of published articles, working papers and book chapters over the period 1995-
2005.  
 
Figure 1 around here  
 
The bulk of recent research focuses on determinants of economic welfare like, e.g., the 
level of per capita GDP and its growth rate, the quality of the public infrastructure, public 
expenditure allocation, total investment and foreign direct investment. In the following, we 
discuss the impact of corruption on these variables. However, before proceeding to the main 
findings of the empirical studies, some general remarks should be raised. First, existing 
empirical analyses mainly base on cross-sectional approaches. Results from these studies may 
overestimate the impact of corruption on the dependent variable because they do not control 
for unobserved country specific characteristics that do not vary over time. Second, most 
empirical studies do not carefully disentangle the high correlation between explanatory 
variables like indices of institutional quality, investment and corruption – to some extent 
challenging their results. Third, while it is obvious that richer countries display a lower level 
of corruption, causality between corruption and economic wealth is still debated. Some 
studies apply two-stage least squares approaches and instrument corruption with an index of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization or origins of the legal system to take endogeneity into 
account. However, the instruments employed clearly affect the results. Finally, the different 
indices of corruption available differ regarding the period of time and number of countries 
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they cover.4 Although correlation among the different indices of corruption is usually rather 
high, results of empirical studies might in some cases be driven by the underlying choice of 
corruption index. 
 
GDP per capita and GDP growth 
Among the first empirical cross-country analyses of the consequences of corruption on 
economic development, MAURO (1995) focuses on GDP per capita growth. To measure 
corruption, he employs the corruption index provided by Business International. Among the 
68 countries in the sample, and independent of the method of estimation, more corrupt 
countries experience both statistically significant lower GDP growth and investment rates. 
Various studies confirm these results. Among others, GDP per capita growth is used as 
dependent variable in MAURO (1996), BRUNETTI (1997), POIRSON (1998), LI, XU and ZOU 
(2000), MO (2001), ABED and DAVOODI (2002), LEITE and WEIDMANN (2002) and GYIMAH-
BREMPONG (2002). All of these studies find a statistically significant negative impact of 
corruption on economic growth in at least some of the estimated specifications. In a more 
recent study MÉON and SEKKAT (2005) analyse how the interaction of corruption and indices 
of good governance affect economic growth. Besides the significantly negative impact of 
corruption on GDP per capita growth, the interaction of corruption and the rule of law as well 
as corruption and government effectiveness affect growth rates significantly negative. This 
leads MÉON and SEKKAT to conclude that corruption will be even more detrimental to growth 
in environments of weak rule of law and low government effectiveness.  
However, the negative impact of corruption on growth is not always confirmed. 
According to PELLEGRINI and GERLAGH (2004), there is no statistically significant direct 
relationship once other relevant factors are controlled for. There are, however, indirect effects 
of corruption on economic growth, as corruption negatively affects investment, schooling, 
trade policies and political stability. Even more surprising, BARRETO (2001) finds a 
significantly positive direct relationship between GDP per capita growth and corruption 
(employing the same indicator of corruption as MAURO, 1995).  
ROCK and BONNETT (2004), finally, analyze the newly industrializing East Asian 
countries which are frequently cited as an exception to the general rule of the negative impact 
corruption has on growth. Despite their comparably high levels of perceived corruption, these 
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countries experienced high growth rates over an extended period of time. Accordingly, ROCK 
and BONNETT find a significantly positive impact of corruption on growth in large East Asian 
countries, whereas the impact on other developing countries’ growth rates remains negative 
and statistically significant.5 One explanation might be that a strong centralized government 
can limit the negative effects of bribery compared to a decentralized corrupt bureaucracy 
(SHLEIFER and VISHNY, 1993). REJA and TALVITIE (2000) provide another explanation. They 
argue that corruption in Asia is part of the fixed costs of doing business, whereas it is a 
variable cost component in Africa.  
The impact of corruption on the level of per capita GDP has also been frequently 
investigated. Not surprisingly, most of these papers find a negative impact of corruption on 
the level of economic development (EHRLICH and LUI, 1999; KAUFMANN, KRAAY and ZOIDO-
LOBATON, 1999b; NEEMAN, PASERMAN and SIMHON, 2004 and WELSCH, 2004). 
The results of these cross-section approaches have, however, recently been challenged. 
According to ISLAM (2004), the unobserved fixed country effects and high multicollinearity 
between explanatory variables are likely to bias the estimation of the impact of corruption on 
per capita GDP. Whereas he finds a significantly negative relationship between corruption 
and GDP per capita in a cross-section model, estimating the same model in first differences – 
thus eliminating the unobserved fixed effects and reducing the correlation between exogenous 
variables – the impact of corruption is no longer significant. The results of ISLAM, 
unfortunately, suffer from very limited country coverage, and the inclusion of only two 
explanatory variables – corruption and total investment. 
As mentioned above, there is a range of different transmission channels by which 
corruption can affect economic development. These transmission channels are discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
Investment 
Starting again with the seminal work of MAURO (1995), the share of investment in GDP is 
employed as dependent variable. According to the results, more corrupt countries experience 
significantly lower investment rates. This result is confirmed by the bulk of literature focusing 
on the ratio of gross investment to GDP (MAURO, 1996; BRUNETTI, KISUNKO and WEDER, 
1998; BRUNETTI and WEDER, 1998; CAMPOS, LIEN and PRADHAN, 1999; MO, 2001; 
LAMBSDORFF, 2003; PELLEGRINI and GERLAGH, 2004). It is also confirmed if the share of 
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private investment in GDP is used as dependent variable instead (CAMPOS, LIEN and 
PRADHAN, 1999).6 Interestingly, the authors find a significantly positive impact of the 
predictability of corruption on gross investment as well as private investment. High levels of 
corruption deter investment but the negative effect diminishes with higher predictability. 
Another topic analyzed intensively is the effect of corruption on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The view that corruption acts like a tax deterring FDI is empirically 
supported by studies of WEI (1999, 2000a, 2000b) and SMARZYNSKA and WEI (2000). An 
increase in the corruption index by about one point has the same effect as a 7.5 percentage 
points increase of the tax rate. In a panel of transition countries ABED and DAVOODI (2002) 
also find that corruption significantly reduces FDI inflows. 
 
Inflation and exchange rate 
According to AL-MARHUBI (2000), corrupt countries experience significantly higher inflation 
rates. Focusing on transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, ABED and DAVOODI 
(2002) confirm this relationship – however, the result does no longer hold once the progress 
of structural reforms is controlled for. While HONLONKOU (2003) also finds a strong partial 
and significant correlation between corruption and the consumer price change, the study fails 
to control for endogeneity and suffers from omitted variables bias (as only one control 
variable is included). 
BAHMANI-OSKOOEE and NASIR (2002) analyze a cross-section of 65 countries and find 
that countries with more corruption significantly tend to depreciate their real exchange rate. 
This depreciation could have positive effects for export oriented countries and sectors but will 
harm net-importers – the bulk of developing countries. 
 
International trade 
In a cross-country analysis LAMBSDORFF (1998) shows that exporters from less corrupt 
countries face disadvantages in import countries with a high corruption level. He uses the 
market share of the 19 largest exporting countries in 86 import markets as dependent variable. 
The corruption index of the importing country is negative and statistically significant, thus 
increasing the market share of the exporter, in the case of Belgium, France, Italy and South 
Korea. The Netherlands and Sweden experience a significantly lower market share in corrupt 
countries. Regarding the competitiveness of US exporters after the 1977 Foreign Corrupt 
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Practices Act, HINES (1995) shows that growth rates of US aircraft exports are significantly 
lower in high corruption destinations. 
 
Government revenues, expenditures and the shadow economy 
Recent research has shown that corruption lowers the quality of public infrastructure, biases 
state expenditures via military expenditures and lowers expenditures on education and health. 
Some studies also relate corruption to the informal sector. The issue of public infrastructure 
quality is analyzed by TANZI and DAVOODI (2002a). In a panel of 68 countries over the period 
1980-95 they find evidence that corruption lowers the quality of roads and increases the 
number of electricity interruptions. Additionally, they find a significantly negative impact of 
corruption on public revenues. Similar results are obtained by TANZI and DAVOODI (2002b) 
employing a larger sample of countries, and by FRIEDMAN ET AL. (2000) focusing on the share 
of tax revenues in GDP. The results of the empirical analysis of FRIEDMAN ET AL. also support 
their hypothesis that corruption significantly increases the shadow economy. JOHNSON, 
KAUFMANN and SHLEIFER (1997) investigate forty-nine countries in Latin America, the 
OECD, and the former Soviet Union block and find a statistically significant positive 
relationship between various measures of corruption and the shadow economy. As they note 
`[…] the relationship between the share of the unofficial economy and the rule of law 
(including corruption) is strong and consistent across seven measures. Countries with more 
corruption have higher shares of the unofficial economy,' (p. 391). As is now well known, 
corruption can act like a tax, can undermine the quality of the bureaucracy and the trust in 
administration and. As a consequence, entrepreneurs might refuse to start business in the 
official economy. As more and more enterprises go underground, governments’ revenue base 
can be substantially eroded.7
Turning to the expenditure side, MAURO (1996; 1998) finds clear evidence that 
corruption lowers government expenditures on education. On the other hand, corrupt 
governments tend to increase military spending significantly (GUPTA, DE MELLO and 
SHARAN, 2001). 
 
Educational and health indicators 
The impact of corruption on various educational and health indicators is explored in a number 
of studies. Among them, GUPTA, DAVOODI and TIONGSON (2002) find a statistically 
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significant negative impact of corruption on child and infant mortality, low birth weight 
babies, births attended by health staff, and repeater and drop out rates in elementary school. 
Regarding child mortality, these findings are supported by KAUFMANN, KRAAY and ZOIDO-
LOBATON (1999b). Additionally, KAUFMANN ET AL. find a significantly negative effect on 
adult literacy. This is in line with MO (2001) who shows that average years of schooling are 
significantly lower in countries with more corruption. PELLEGRINI and GERLAGH (2004), to 
the contrary, do not find a significant relationship between these two variables. 
 
Other effects of corruption 
It is obvious that corruption also affects institutional quality. As one example, corruption 
leads to more restrictions on the capital account (WEI, 2000c; BAI and WEI, 2000; DREHER 
and SIEMERS, 2003). HERZFELD and WEISS (2003) analyze the relationship between 
corruption and the rule of law and find a strong negative relationship. Countries with more 
corruption experience lower acceptance of established institutions, weakened political 
institutions and a deficient court system. Finally, MO (2001) shows that more corrupt 
countries are exposed to higher political instability. 
A number of studies focus on the impact of corruption on poverty and inequality. They 
find a strongly positive relationship between corruption and income inequality (GUPTA, 
DAVOODI and ALONSO-TERME, 2002; BARRETO, 2001; GYIMAH-BREMPONG, 2002). FOELLMI 
and OECHSLIN (2003) show that more corruption is significantly related to an increase of the 
income share of the richest 20 percent. LI, XU and ZOU (2000) estimate a nonlinear 
relationship in including the squared corruption index and find that the initial increase in 
inequality due to corruption is eventually reversed. An increase in corruption results in an 
increase of income inequality up to an index of 2.9 on a scale between 0 and 6 and in a 
decreasing effect afterwards.8  
WELSCH (2004) analyzes the influence of corruption on environmental characteristics 
and finds a significantly positive impact on ambient pollution, like the concentration of SO2, 
NO2 or total suspended particles in urban air. Interestingly, there is no significant relationship 
between corruption and environmental stress, measured as fertilizer and pesticide use and 
emissions per populated land. 
Analyzing the effect of corruption on aid, ALESINA and WEDER (2002) find no 
statistically significant effect of corruption on multilateral aid flows. The same applies to debt 
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relief. To the contrary, analyzing bilateral aid flows, ALESINA and WEDER find significantly 
higher flows from the USA and significantly lower flows from Australia and Scandinavian 
countries to more corrupt recipient countries. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
In this section, we analyze the impact of corruption on economic growth and GDP per capita 
empirically – following the cross-country framework established by BARRO (1997). Our 
cross-section data are averages over the years 1975-2001 and extend to a maximum of 71 
countries. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the number of 
observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. To measure corruption, we 
employ the perceptions based ICRG index. However, we rescale the index so that higher 
levels represent more corruption instead of less as on the original scale. All variables, their 
precise definitions and data sources are listed in Appendix B. 
While the main focus of the analysis is on economic growth and GDP per capita, we 
employ six additional dependent variables also. All of them have been identified as being 
affected by corruption in the previous section. We include them to our analysis because in 
order to estimate the overall impact of corruption on GDP and GDP growth, we have to take 
the indirect effects via other potentially important determinants of those variables into account 
as well. We follow the previous literature to identify variables that are likely to contribute to 
GDP per capita and GDP growth: The initial level of GDP per capita in the year 1970 is 
included to measure the conditional rate of convergence to the steady state growth rate. 
Secondary school enrolment and life expectancy are employed as indicators of human capital. 
Higher domestic investment as a share of GDP should lead to higher growth rates whereas the 
effect of higher government consumption is not obvious a priori. On the one hand, a large 
government sector may induce inefficiencies and crowd out the private sector. On the other 
hand, the provision of an efficient infrastructure and a proper legal framework may promote 
growth (HANSSON, 2000). Foreign aid has also been suggested to impact on growth – either 
positively, because aid allows the financing of development projects and helps overcoming 
inefficiencies or negatively, as it helps staying autocratic governments in power and reduces 
incentives to develop (see DREHER, 2004, for a discussion). Finally, we include a country’s 
rate of inflation which has been shown to have a significant effect on growth in previous 
studies. 
 Most of the independent variables in our growth and GDP equations, however, have 
also been identified as being affected by corruption (see the literature review above). If, e.g., 
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investment is affected by corruption, it is endogenous to our regressions, and the same is true 
for the other covariates. Therefore, we treat all those variables (except for initial GDP) as 
endogenous and explain them with their most important determinants as identified in the 
previous literature. 
 Following GUPTA, DAVOODI and TIONGSON (2002), the school enrolment ratio is 
hypothesized to depend on public spending on education (in percent of GDP), the Age 
Dependency Ratio and the percent of urban population in total population. Life expectancy is 
explained by health expenditure (in percent of GDP) and the ratio of girls to boys in primary 
and secondary education (GUPTA, DAVOODI and TIONGSON, 2002). We explain investment in 
percent of GDP with the 1970 value of GDP, openness to trade and the school enrolment ratio 
(MÉON and SEKKAT, 2005), government consumption with real GDP growth and the rate of 
inflation (DREHER and VAUBEL, 2004), the rate of inflation with government consumption (in 
percent of GDP) and a dummy for fixed exchange rate regimes (ABED and DAVOODI, 2002), 
and aid in percent of GDP with the budget deficit and the current account balance (both in 
percent of GDP), an index of democracy and GDP per capita (DREHER and VAUBEL, 2004). 
We start by estimating individual regressions for the eight dependent variables (Table 
1). Tables 2 and 3 contain systems of all equations estimated jointly by 3SLS, either including 
GDP growth (Table 2) or GDP per capita (Table 3). In the first stage, 3SLS uses instruments 
for all endogenous variables. These instruments are the predicted values resulting from a 
regression of each endogenous variable on all exogenous variables included in the system. 
The second stage estimates the covariance matrix of the equation errors using the residuals 
from a 2SLS estimation of each equation. In the third stage, GLS estimation employing the 
covariance matrix estimated in the second stage and the instruments in place of the 
endogenous variables is performed. This procedure is consistent and, in general, 
asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS.9
As can be seen in the Tables, the results crucially depend on whether the equations are 
estimated separately, or jointly as a system. In the following, we discuss the results for the 
individual dependent variables separately. 
  
School enrolment and life expectancy 
As can be seen in Tables 1 - 3, school enrolment is significantly lower in an aging society – 
with a coefficient significant at the one percent level in all three equations. When estimated as 
a system, school enrolment is also significantly affected by education expenditures (at the one 
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percent level of significance), with a positive coefficient. Urbanization, to the contrary, only 
affects schooling in the regression of Table 1 – and only at the ten percent level of 
significance. As the tables show, life expectancy rises significantly with a higher girls to boys 
ratio in schooling. In all three regressions this relationship is significant at the one percent 
level, whereas – surprisingly – health expenditures increase life expectancy only in the 
regressions of Table 1. 
Regarding corruption, the results show that life expectancy is significantly lower in 
corrupt countries, while there is no consistent result for the school enrolment ratio. Only the 
individual regression of Table 1 implies a negative impact of corruption on schooling, at the 
five percent level of significance. The coefficients show that the impact is, however, 
quantitatively important. An increase in the index of corruption by one point reduces school 
enrolment by almost 5 percentage points and life expectancy by about 2½ years. This is in 
line with previous results. MO (2001), e.g., finds that a one unit increase of the corruption 
index lowers average schooling years by 0.25 years. 
 
Investment 
Across all equations, investment (as a percent of GDP) is significantly higher with more 
openness to trade. The 1970 level of GDP significantly reduces investment in two regressions; 
a better educated population implies more investment when the equations are estimated 
jointly. Surprisingly, investment is not significantly affected by corruption in any regression. 
This is contrary to the results of PELLEGRINI and GERLAGH (2004), concluding that a one 
standard deviation increase in corruption lowers investment by around 2.5 percentage points. 
According to MAURO (1995), the impact amounts to 2.9 percentage points; MAURO (1996) 
presents estimates between 2.3-4.5 percentage points. 
 
Government expenditures 
Again, there are no unanimous results regarding the covariates across the three equations. 
According to the results of Tables 1 and 3, government expenditure (as a percent of GDP) is 
not significantly affected by GDP growth and inflation, whereas Table 2 shows significant 
coefficients for both variables. According to those results, expenditures are lower when the 
economy is growing and inflation is high. Corruption reduces expenditures in the regressions 
of Tables 1 and 2, but is marginally insignificant in the system including per capita GDP 
(Table 3). The magnitude of the coefficients implies that an increase in corruption by one 




Inflation is significantly lower when the exchange rate is pegged. Government expenditures 
have no significant impact on inflation. Corruption has a significant impact in only one of the 
three regressions and only at the ten percent level of significance. When estimated as part of 
the system including economic growth, an increase in the corruption index by one point 
reduces the inflation rate by about 45 percentage points. The negative impact of corruption on 
inflation is not in line with AL-MARHUBI (2000). His results show that reducing corruption by 
one index point reduces the log of average annual inflation by 0.17 – 0.26 points. 
 
Aid 
Aid (as a percent of GDP) is significantly lower when countries experience current account 
surpluses and – in two regressions – are more democratic. This is true although we control for 
GDP per capita, which is also significant in two equations. As can be seen, however, aid is 
declining with per capita GDP in the results of Table 3 and rising in those of Table 2. 
Regarding corruption, we only obtain a significant coefficient in one regression (reported in 
Table 2). The coefficient – significant at the five percent level – shows that aid is increasing 
with corruption. This contrasts the findings by ALESINA and WEDER (2002). They find for a 
variety of corruption indices in 11 out of 17 specifications a positive relationship between 
corruption and aid per capita inflows. All except one of these coefficients, however, fail to be 
statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level.  
 
GDP per capita and GDP growth 
Turning to the overall costs of corruption in terms of GDP per capita and GDP growth, we 
focus on the two systems shown in Tables 2 and 3. In both systems, the corruption index is 
jointly significant at the five percent level. Regarding GDP growth, Table 2 shows that 
growth is significantly higher with more investment, less government expenditures, less 
inflation, less aid received, and, of course, less corruption. Life expectancy, school enrolment 
and initial GDP do not significantly affect growth. 
 In estimating the direct and indirect effects of corruption on growth, we only take 
those coefficients into account that are significant in the growth equation at the ten percent 
level at least. As one example, one point increase in the index of corruption reduces 
government expenditures (in percent of GDP) by 1.96 percentage points. A one percentage 
point increase in government consumption, in turn, reduces economic growth by 0.23 
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percentage points per year. The overall effect of an increase in the index of corruption 
(implying an increase in corruption) by one point via the government’s expenditure channel 
thus amounts to an increase in growth of 0.451 percentage points. Calculating the indirect 
effects for all significant explanatory variables along those lines gives the following results: a 
one percentage point increase in the corruption index increases growth by 0.129 percentage 
points via the investment channel, by 0.225 percentage points via the inflation channel and 
reduces growth by 0.106 percentage points via the foreign aid channel. Overall, and taking the 
direct impact of corruption on economic growth into account, the effect amounts to 0.13 
percentage points per year. Compared to the previous literature, this estimate is at the lower 
bound. According to the estimates of AIZENMAN and GLICK (2003), GDP growth would rise 
by 0.5 percentage points due to a reduction of corruption by one index point, GYIMAH-
BREMPONG (2002) estimates this effect to be in the range of 0.39-0.41. 
Turning to GDP per capita, the results of Table 3 show that only four variables have a 
significant impact. GDP per capita rises with higher initial GDP, lower school enrolment, a 
higher investment ratio, and less corruption. As can be seen in the Table, a reduction in the 
index of corruption by one point reduces GDP per capita by about 683 constant 1995 US$ via 
the direct impact. Regarding the indirect effects, a one percentage point increase in the 
corruption index reduces per capita GDP by 28 US$ via the school enrolment channel and 
increases GDP by 286 US$ via the investment channel. Overall thus, a one percentage point 
increase in the corruption index reduces GDP per capita by 425 US$ (per year). 
As a next step we employ our estimates to calculate the costs of corruption on the 
economy. For each country in the sample with a level of corruption exceeding the sample 
average, we calculate the costs of being more corrupt than the average sample country. The 
sample average of 2.91 comes close to the levels of corruption of Kuwait, Croatia, Zimbabwe, 
Turkey, and Thailand. Table 4 reports the results for the direct and overall impact of 
corruption. As can be seen, the results for the direct costs of corruption vary between a yearly 
reduction of 0.04 percentage points for Syria and 1.66 percentage points for Liberia.  
Table 5 reports the costs of being more corrupt than the average sample country in 
terms of GDP per capita. The results show that the costs of corruption are substantial. The 
biggest loss due to corruption is again experienced by Liberia. With an actual average GDP of 
535 constant 1995 US$ over the period 1970-2001, the overall loss due to being more corrupt 




The WORLD BANK (2001) has identified corruption as `the single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development'. More recently, the WORLD BANK (2004) has estimated 
that more than US$ 1 trillion is paid in bribes each year and that countries that tackle 
corruption, improve governance and the rule of law could increase per capita incomes by 400 
percent. These results have recently been supported by DREHER, KOTSOGIANNIS and 
MCCORRISTON (2004a, 2004b), applying a structural equation modelling approach to measure 
corruption as a latent variable. This method directly relates the incidence of corruption across 
countries to causes and indicators of corruption rather than to perception-based surveys. As a 
consequence, their index of corruption is both ordinal and cardinal in nature, allowing to 
calculate the economic losses due to corruption as a percentage of GDP. Based on a sample of 
approximately 100 countries covering five different time periods, DREHER, KOTSOGIANNIS 
and MCCORRISTON (2004a, 2004b) show that the losses due to corruption are especially high 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and have been increasing in transition economies since the 1980s. 
According to their results, in 1991-97, Guinea-Bissau is the world’s most corrupt country, 
with a loss of almost 70 percent of its potential GDP. For the period 1998-2002, using a 
different set of explanatory variables, however, the estimated loss is much lower: about 27 
percent of GDP. 
In this paper, we followed a different strategy. Using simple cross-section analysis, we 
estimated the effect of corruption on economic growth and per capita GDP in a system where 
we allow for their main determinants also being affected by corruption. Calculating the direct 
and indirect effects of corruption from the regression estimates, we estimated for each 
individual country the costs of being more corrupt than the average sample country. Our 
results show that these costs are indeed substantial. 
However, our results also show that the estimates have to be interpreted with caution. 
Comparing the results of the individual regressions of Table 1 with those of the system-
regressions of Tables 2 and 3, for example, reveals that the results crucially depend on the 
method of estimation. Previous research has shown that they do also depend on the choice of 
corruption measures, country coverage, endogeneity of corruption, and the period of 
estimation. This lends support to recent alternative approaches in calculating the costs of 
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Table 1: Impact of Corruption, OLS (cross-section, average 1975-2001) 
School Enrolment Life Expectancy Investment (percent of GDP) Government Expenditure (percent of GDP) 
Expenditure on Education 0.34 Expenditure on Health 0.77 Initial GDP (year 1970) -0.0001 GDP growth -0.26 
    (percent of GDP) (0.51)     (percent of GDP) (2.09**)  (1.06)  (1.11) 
Age Dependency Ratio -81.02 Ratio of girls to boys 0.39 Openness to Trade 0.04 Inflation 0.002 
 (5.31***)     in school (7.98***)  (3.60***)  (0.90) 
Urban Population 0.20   School Enrolment 0.02   




   (1.04)   
Corruption -4.65 Corruption
 
      
     
     
      
    

















number of observations 134  136  93  126 
adjusted R2 0.47       0.59 0.15 0.12
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Table 1 (continued) 
Inflation Aid (percent of GDP)  GDP growth GDP per capita 
Government Expenditure 2.12 Democracy, Index -0.40 Initial GDP (year 1970) -0.00006 0.683 
    (percent of GDP) (0.57)  
  
    
      
      
      
    
    
    
      
     
 (2.19**)  (1.15) (10.00***)
Fixed Exchange Rates, -322.12 Overall Budget Deficit  -0.20 School Enrolment -0.014 1.448 
    Dummy (4.69***)     (percent of GDP) (1.49)  (1.69*) (0.13) 
  GDP per capita 
  




  Current Account Balance -0.44 Investment 0.14 116.36 




    (percent of GDP) (3.81***) 
 
(2.38**) 
Government Expenditure -0.011 -38.3
















(0.69) (0.52) (1.41) (2.83***)






number of observations 102  97  71 71 
adjusted R2 0.16      0.37 0.44 0.74
 
Notes: 
Dependent variables are school enrollment, life expectancy, investment, government expenditure, inflation, aid, GDP growth, and GDP per capita. 
‘t’-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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 Table 2: Impact of Corruption, System including Economic Growth, 3SLS (cross-section, 54 countries, average 1975-2001) 
School Enrolment Life Expectancy Investment (percent of GDP) Government Expenditure(percent of GDP) 
Expenditure on Education 5.38 Expenditure on Health 0.10 Initial GDP (year 1970) -0.0004 GDP growth -3.51 
    (percent of GDP) (3.36***)     (percent of GDP) (0.20)  (2.89***)  (5.55***)
Age Dependency Ratio -92.53 Ratio of girls to boys 0.31 Openness to Trade 0.05 Inflation -0.03 
 (4.68***)     in school (4.64***)  (4.14***)  (3.76***)
Urban Population -0.09   School Enrolment 0.15   
    (percent of total) 
 
(0.71)    (4.10***)   
Corruption -0.98 Corruption
 
   
    
    
     
     






(0.27) (1.92*) (1.10) (2.88***)







”R2” 0.33  0.46 0.09  0.66
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Table 2 (continued) 
Inflation  Aid (percent of GDP) GDP growth 
Government Expenditure -6.26 Democracy, Index -0.41 Initial GDP (year 1970) 0.00002
    (percent of GDP) (1.32)  (2.28**)  (0.43) 
Fixed Exchange Rates, -316.73 Overall Budget Deficit  -0.11 School Enrolment -0.002 
    Dummy (3.45***)     (percent of GDP) (0.70)  (0.13) 
  GDP per capita 
  





     
    
    
    
   
    
    
      
      
(2.92***) (1.58)
  Current Account Balance -0.76 Investment 0.13 
      (percent of GDP) 
  
(6.24***)     (percent of GDP) (2.96***)
 Government Expenditure -0.23













Constant 289.97 Constant 5.38 Constant 8.13
(2.30**) (2.84***) (2.51**)
”R2” 0.15 0.69 0.01
 
Notes: 
All regressions estimated jointly. 
‘t’-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Impact of Corruption, System including GDP per capita, 3SLS (cross-section, 54 countries, average 1975-2001) 
School Enrolment Life Expectancy Investment (percent of GDP) Government Expenditure (percent of GDP) 
Expenditure on Education 4.68 Expenditure on Health 0.17 Initial GDP (year 1970) -0.0004 GDP growth -0.57 
    (percent of GDP) (2.89***)     (percent of GDP) (0.33)  (2.95***)  (1.47) 
Age Dependency Ratio -89.22 Ratio of girls to boys 0.33 Openness to Trade 0.06 Inflation -0.005 
 (4.49***)     in school (4.78***)  (5.43***)  (0.75) 
Urban Population -0.003   School Enrolment 0.16   
    (percent of total) 
 
(0.03)    (4.25***)
 
  
Corruption -0.69      
     
        
      
      








(0.19) (1.71*) (1.35) (1.62)





”R2” 0.35  0.46 0.05  0.05
 
Table 3 (continued) 
Inflation Aid (percent of GDP) GDP per capita 
Government Expenditure -2.64 Democracy, Index -0.28 Initial GDP (year 1970) 0.59 
    (percent of GDP) (0.53)  (1.46)  (8.40***) 
Fixed Exchange Rates, -363.01 Overall Budget Deficit  0.08 School Enrolment -40.31 
    Dummy (3.81***)     (percent of GDP) (0.49)  (1.89*) 
  GDP per capita 
  





     
     
    
    
    
    
     
      
     
(1.79*) (1.58)
  Current Account Balance -0.69 Investment 236.56 
      (percent of GDP) 
  
(5.53***)     (percent of GDP) (3.92***) 
  Government Expenditure 21.40















Constant 295.62 Constant 12.08 Constant -12485.91
(2.28***) (2.90***) (3.23***)
”R2” 0.232 0.697 0.701
 
Notes: 
All regressions estimated jointly. 
‘t’-statistics in parentheses: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 4: Average yearly reduction of GDP growth due to above average corruption 
 
country overall direct country overall direct 
Liberia 0.26 1.66 Uganda 0.08 0.48 
Bangladesh 0.23 1.47 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.07 0.46 
Haiti 0.21 1.33 Ethiopia 0.07 0.44 
Paraguay 0.20 1.26 Cameroon 0.07 0.41 
Gabon 0.19 1.22 Jamaica 0.07 0.41 
Indonesia 0.19 1.17 United Arab Emirates 0.06 0.39 
Iraq 0.16 1.03 Kazakhstan 0.05 0.34 
Sudan 0.16 1.01 Niger 0.05 0.32 
Myanmar 0.16 0.99 Vietnam 0.05 0.31 
Nigeria 0.15 0.94 Zambia 0.04 0.27 
Guyana 0.14 0.87 Guatemala 0.04 0.25 
Mali 0.14 0.87 Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 0.04 0.25 
Sierra Leone 0.12 0.78 Ukraine 0.04 0.24 
Armenia 0.12 0.76 Colombia 0.04 0.23 
Azerbaijan 0.12 0.76 Ghana 0.03 0.20 
Guinea-Bissau 0.12 0.76 Kenya 0.03 0.18 
Honduras 0.12 0.76 Suriname 0.02 0.15 
Moldova 0.12 0.76 Angola 0.02 0.13 
Panama 0.12 0.76 El Salvador 0.02 0.13 
Qatar 0.12 0.76 Cuba 0.02 0.12 
Togo 0.12 0.76 India 0.02 0.11 
Pakistan 0.11 0.69 Morocco 0.02 0.11 
Bahamas 0.11 0.68 Trinidad and Tobago 0.02 0.11 
Lebanon 0.11 0.66 Kuwait 0.01 0.09 
Bolivia 0.09 0.56 Zimbabwe 0.01 0.09 
Russian Federation 0.09 0.55 Thailand 0.01 0.08 
Saudi Arabia 0.09 0.55 Croatia 0.01 0.06 
Somalia 0.09 0.54 Turkey 0.01 0.06 
Philippines 0.08 0.50 Syrian Arab Republic 0.01 0.04 
Table 5: Average yearly reduction in per capita GDP due to above average corruption 
(constant 1995 US$) 
country overall direct  country overall direct 
Liberia 847 1363  Uganda 245 395
Bangladesh 752 1211  Egypt, Arab Rep. 233 376
Haiti 682 1097  Ethiopia 224 361
Paraguay 646 1040  Cameroon 210 338
Gabon 623 1002  Jamaica 210 338
Indonesia 599 964  United Arab Emirates 198 319
Iraq 528 850  Kazakhstan 175 281
Sudan 517 831  Niger 162 261
Myanmar 505 812  Vietnam 157 252
Nigeria 481 774  Zambia 139 224
Guyana 446 717  Guatemala 127 205
Mali 446 717  Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 127 205
Sierra Leone 399 643  Ukraine 121 195
Armenia 387 623  Colombia 116 186
Azerbaijan 387 623  Ghana 104 167
Guinea-Bissau 387 623  Kenya 92 148
Honduras 387 623  Suriname 75 120
Moldova 387 623  Angola 68 110
Panama 387 623  El Salvador 68 110
Qatar 387 623  Cuba 62 101
Togo 387 623  India 57 91
Pakistan 351 566  Morocco 57 91
Bahamas 349 562  Trinidad and Tobago 57 91
Lebanon 340 547  Kuwait 45 72
Bolivia 287 461  Zimbabwe 45 72
Russian Federation 281 452  Thailand 39 63
Saudi Arabia 281 452  Croatia 33 53
Somalia 274 442  Turkey 33 53



















Figure A1: Use of corruption indicators in empirical research on the consequences of corruption 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Source Definition 
GDP growth (annual %) WORLD BANK (2003) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant 1995 U.S. 
dollars. 
GDP per capita WORLD BANK (2003) GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars. 
School enrolment, preprimary (% 
gross) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Preprimary education refers to the initial 
stage of organized instruction, designed 
primarily to introduce very young children 
to a school-type environment. 
Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Life expectancy at birth indicates the 
number of years a newborn infant would 
live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the 
time of its birth were to stay the same 
throughout its life. 
Democracy MARSHALL and 
JAGGERS (2000) 
0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy score. 
Measures the general openness of political 
institutions. 
Investment (% of GDP) WORLD BANK (2003) Outlays on additions to the fixed assets of 
the economy plus net changes in the level of 
inventories. 
General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
WORLD BANK (2003) General government final consumption 
expenditure (formerly general government 
consumption) includes all government 
current expenditures for purchases of goods 
and services (including compensation of 
employees). 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual 
%) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Inflation as measured by the consumer price 
index reflects the annual percentage change 
in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a fixed basket of goods and 
services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
Trade (% of GDP) WORLD BANK (2003) Trade is the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. 
Public spending on education, 
total (% of GDP) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Public expenditure on education consists of 
public spending on public education plus 
subsidies to private education at the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. 
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Appendix B (continued) 
 
Variable Source Definition 
Age dependency ratio (dependents 
to working-age population) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Age dependency ratio is the ratio of 
dependents--people younger than 15 and 
older than 64--to the working-age 
population--those ages 15-64. For example, 
0.7 means there are 7 dependents for every 
10 working-age people. 
Urban population (% of total) WORLD BANK (2003) Urban population is the share of the total 
population living in areas defined as urban 
in each country. 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary 
and secondary education (%) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Ratio of girls to boys in primary and 
secondary education is the percentage of 
girls to boys enrolled at primary and 
secondary levels in public and private 
schools. 
Health expenditure, total (% of 
GDP) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Total health expenditure is the sum of 
public and private health expenditures. It 
covers the provision of health services 
(preventive and curative), family planning 
activities, nutrition activities, and 
emergency aid designated for health but 
does not include provision of water and 
sanitation. 
Overall budget balance, including 
grants (% of GDP) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Overall budget balance is current and 
capital revenue and official grants received, 
less total expenditure and lending minus 
repayments. Data are shown for central 
government only. 
Money and quasi money growth 
(annual %) 
WORLD BANK (2003) This definition is frequently called M2 
Short-term debt (% of total 
external debt) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Short-term debt includes all debt having an 
original maturity of one year or less and 
interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
Fixed Exchange Rates, dummy REINHART and ROGOFF 
(2004) 
Equals zero if one of the following 
categories applies: Freely Floating, Freely 
Falling, Freely Falling/Freely Floating, 
Freely Falling/Managed Floating, Freely 
Floating/Dual Market, Freely falling/Dual 
Market, Freely Falling/Multiple Rates, 
Freely Falling/Crawling Band, Freely 
Falling/Parallel Market. 
Current account balance (% of 
GDP) 
WORLD BANK (2003) Current account balance is the sum of net 
exports of goods, services, net income, and 
net current transfers. 
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Variable Source Definition 
Aid (% of GNI) WORLD BANK (2003) Official development assistance and net 
official aid record the actual international 
transfer by the donor of financial resources 
or of goods or services valued at the cost to 
the donor, less any repayments of loan 
principal during the same period. Grants by 
official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee are 
included, as are loans with a grant element 
of at least 25 percent, and technical 
cooperation and assistance. Aid dependency 
ratios are computed using values in U.S. 
dollars converted at official exchange rates. 
Corruption ICRG perception based 
index (rescaled) 
Measures corruption in the political system 
as a threat to foreign investment based on 
the analysis of a worldwide network of 
experts. Range 0 (no corruption) to 6 
(highest corruption). 
 
 
 
